

# The rebugnant conclusion

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## 1. Introduction

We are currently in the midst of rapid moral circle expansion. The animal advocacy movement has made significant progress over the past 50 years by normalizing the idea that we have moral duties to captive and domesticated animals. We are now in the early stages of normalizing the idea that we also have moral duties to free and wild animals. Some of us accept that we have such duties because we think that we should help others when we can. Others of us accept that we have such duties because we think that we are harming many of these animals, and that we should reduce and repair these harms when we can. Regardless, the idea that we have duties to trillions, if not quadrillions, of nonhuman animals is fast gaining acceptance.<sup>1</sup>

This rapid moral circle expansion is raising many difficult questions about our moral priorities. For instance, humans are currently harming and killing tens of billions of captive and domesticated animals per year and hundreds of billions of free and wild animals per year.<sup>2</sup> At least in terms of scale and neglectedness, then, our duties to current and near future nonhuman animals would seem to take priority over our duties to current and near future humans, all else equal. Granted, we might think that we should prioritize humans for other reasons, including

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<sup>1</sup> For more on the ethics of helping free and wild animals, see Kyle Johannsen, *Wild Animal Ethics: the Moral and Political Problem of Wild Animal Suffering* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2021), Clare Palmer, *Animal Ethics in Context* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2010), and Jeff Sebo, *Saving Animals, Saving Ourselves* (New York: Oxford University Press, forthcoming).

<sup>2</sup> Bas Sanders, "Global animal slaughter statistics and charts: 2020 update," Faunalytics (2020): <https://faunalytics.org/global-animal-slaughter-statistics-and-charts-2020-update/>

reasons involving tractability and indirect effects, as we will see. Still, we are slowly coming to terms with the idea that nonhumans matter much more than we previously thought.

But as substantial as this moral expansion has been, it is not nearly complete. For instance, our discussion of duties to captive and domesticated animals tend to focus on animals such as cats, dogs, cows, pigs, and chickens. And our discussion of duties to free and wild animals tend to focus on animals such as chimpanzees, elephants, koalas, dolphins, and polar bears. While there is no single category that includes all these animals, in general we seem to focus more on large animals than on small animals, on vertebrates than on invertebrates, and on land animals than on aquatic animals. The result is a moral community that is many times larger than it was before, but still many times smaller than, I believe, it should be.

When we take seriously the possibility of a moral community that includes all sentient beings – large and small, vertebrate and invertebrate, terrestrial and aquatic – we realize that this next expansion might, if anything, be even more transformative than the last one. The world is full of conflicting interests and needs, and is also full of very different kinds of populations. For instance, if we have to choose between improving the lives of a relatively small number of relatively large animals and improving the lives of a relatively large number of relatively small animals, then which should we choose and why? In this kind of world, questions about multi-species priority-setting are much more complex and important.

Suppose that we determine that large animals like humans have more welfare on average but that small animals like insects have more welfare in total. What follows for ethics and politics? Which populations should we prioritize within each generation, all else equal? And which populations should we prioritize in future generations, all else equal? Suppose further that we determine that many beings, including microscopic organisms and current and near future

artificial intelligences, are at least *possibly* sentient, and that the size of these populations relative to insects rivals the size of insect populations relative to humans. How, if at all, should that possibility affect our moral priorities within and across generations?

My aim in this paper is to survey these questions from a utilitarian perspective, building on related work from Oscar Horta, Yew-Kwang Ng, Brian Tomasik, and others.<sup>3</sup> I will show that utilitarianism implies that insects can, indeed, take priority over humans and that other, smaller beings can likewise take priority over insects. Granted, we might still have reason to prioritize humans at present and in the near future since, for instance, our duties to distant future generations outweigh our duties to present and near future generations, and since improving human lives at present is key to helping distant future generations. But in this case, what saves the utilitarian from one revisionary conclusion might be another, as we will see.

To be clear, while I focus on utilitarianism here for the sake of simplicity, I think that other moral theories must face versions of these questions as well. Any theory that involves a duty of beneficence or, at least, a duty of non-maleficence will have to deal with questions about how to set priorities between small populations of large animals and large populations of small animals. And no matter what, there will be surprising implications, including “utility monster” implications if we select the former and “repugnant conclusion” implications if we select the latter.<sup>4</sup> So while my discussion here might focus on how one moral theory might navigate this strange future, we should keep in mind that this strange future awaits us all.

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<sup>3</sup> Oscar Horta, “Debunking the Idyllic View of Natural Processes: Population Dynamics and Suffering in the Wild,” *Telos: Revista Iberoamericana de Estudios Utilitaristas* 17, no. 1 (2010): 73-90; Yew-Kwang Ng, “Towards welfare biology: Evolutionary economics of animal consciousness and suffering,” *Biology and Philosophy* 10 (1995), 255-285; and Brian Tomasik, “The importance of wild animal suffering,” *Relations* 3:2 (2015), 133-152.

<sup>4</sup> For more on the utility monster problem, see Robert Nozick, *Anarchy, State, and Utopia* (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1974). For more on the repugnant conclusion, see Derek Parfit, *Reasons and Persons* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1984), 381-90.

## 2. Background

Any discussion about how to set priorities in a multi-species community must begin with a certain set of normative and empirical assumptions. So I begin in this section by clearly stating the assumptions that will govern my discussion here. In short: Normatively, I will assume a classical utilitarian moral theory, according to which we morally ought to maximize pleasure and minimize pain in the world. And empirically, I will assume that many beings might be sentient; that beings with larger brains and longer lifespans tend to have the capacity for more pleasure and pain than beings with smaller brains and shorter life spans; and that many other factors will be relevant to our priorities too, such as tractability and indirect effects.

Consider first my normative assumptions. Utilitarianism involves a hedonist theory of the good. According to hedonism, the only intrinsically and finally good state in the world is pleasure, that is, positively valenced conscious experience. And the only intrinsically and finally bad state in the world is pain, that is, negatively valenced conscious experience. Everything else in the world is only, at most, extrinsically or instrumentally valuable, depending on its relationship with pleasure or pain. For example, to the degree that knowledge promotes more pleasure than pain, knowledge is good according to utilitarianism. But to the degree that knowledge has the opposite effect, knowledge is bad according to utilitarianism.<sup>5</sup>

Utilitarianism also involves a totalist theory of the good, according to which the world is better the more pleasure it contains and the less pain it contains in total. So, if one world contains

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<sup>5</sup> For more on the features of utilitarianism discussed in this section, see Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek and Peter Singer, *Utilitarianism: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017). For general discussion of the pros and cons of utilitarianism and other moral theories, see Julia Driver, *Ethics The Fundamentals* (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2007).

a higher amount of pleasure in total and another contains a higher amount of pleasure on average, then utilitarianism implies that the former world is better. Similarly, if one world contains a higher amount of pleasure in total and another contains a higher amount of pleasure for the worst-off, utilitarianism once again implies that the former world is better. Of course, we might think that matters are more complex in practice, since, for instance, prioritizing the worst-off can sometimes maximize pleasure. Either way, what maximizes pleasure is best.

Finally, utilitarianism involves a maximizing act consequentialist theory of the right. According to act consequentialism, the rightness or wrongness of an action depends on the consequences of that action. And according to maximizing act consequentialism, an action is right if and only if it maximizes the good (or, in the scalar formulation, an action is right to the degree that, and only to the degree that, it maximizes the good). So when we combine maximizing act consequentialism with hedonism and totalism, we get classical utilitarianism: An action is right if and only if, or to the degree and only to the degree that, it produces a state of affairs with more net pleasure than all other possible states of affairs.

At least in theory, utilitarianism is highly demanding and unrestrictive. It implies that we might sometimes be required to sacrifice our own well-being for the greater good. It also implies that we might sometimes be required to sacrifice the few for the many. Granted, we might think that matters are more complex in practice. For instance, we might think that we need to take care of ourselves and invest in systems of rights, virtues, and relationships of care in order to do the most good possible effectively and sustainably. But even if so, morality might still be more

demanding and less restrictive than we might have expected, and insofar as it involves non-consequentialist norms in practice, it does so for ultimately consequentialist reasons.<sup>6</sup>

As this last point suggests, I am not assuming utilitarianism here because I reject other moral theories. Far from it. As I argue elsewhere, I think that most people in most contexts should accept a pluralistic, partly consequentialist and partly non-consequentialist moral theory in practice. We should accept such a theory in part for principled reasons. For instance, utilitarians should accept such a theory since we sometimes need to respect rights in order to promote welfare, and rights theorists should accept such a theory because we sometimes need to promote welfare in order to respect rights. We should also accept such a theory on strategic grounds, since it can serve as the basis for collaboration in advocacy and policy.<sup>7</sup>

Instead, I am assuming utilitarianism here simply because the issues that I discuss in this paper are complex, and it would be difficult to assess them from multiple moral theories at the same time. So my strategy will be to (start to) assess these issues from a utilitarian perspective for the sake of simplicity and specificity. My hope is that we can then assess these issues from other perspectives as well, and then put these analyses together in order to arrive at a preliminary understanding of how to set priorities in a multi-species community that includes relatively small populations of relatively large animals and relatively large populations of relatively small animals. To that extent, my analysis here will be highly preliminary and incomplete.

Now consider my empirical assumptions. My first empirical assumption is that many beings at least *might* be sentient (that is, might have the capacity to experience pleasure and pain), given the evidence available. Granted, we might think that some beings are more likely to

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<sup>6</sup> For more on indirect consequentialism, see Henry Sidgwick, *The Methods of Ethics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011/1874) and R.M. Hare, *Moral Thinking: Its levels, method, and point* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981).

<sup>7</sup> For more on these points, see [reference omitted].

be sentient than others. For instance, we might think that mammals are more likely to be sentient than insects, and that insects are more likely to be sentient than microbes or current or near future artificial intelligences. But we are not, at present, able to rule out the possibility that any of these beings are sentient. Even if we assign an *astronomically low* probability to the idea that, say, nematodes are sentient, we should not assign a probability of zero to that idea at present.

My reason for making this assumption is that the problem of other minds limits how much we can know about other minds at present (and for the foreseeable future). Since the only mind that I can directly access is my own, I am not able to directly confirm or disconfirm what, if anything, it might be like to be anyone or anything other than myself. And while some theories of consciousness, such as higher order thought theories, imply that only some of the beings listed above are conscious, other theories, such as panpsychist theories, imply that they all are. Unless and until we make substantial progress on the hard problem of consciousness, we will need to keep an open mind about the scope of sentience in the world.<sup>8</sup>

My second empirical assumption, which I gestured at a moment ago, is that beings with larger brains and longer life spans will tend to have the capacity for more welfare than beings with smaller brains and shorter life spans. For instance, we might think that an individual human has a higher capacity for welfare than an individual insect, and that an individual insect has a higher capacity for welfare than an individual microscopic organism or current or near future artificial intelligence (assuming, of course, that these beings have the capacity for any welfare at all). Once again, we might think that some of these beings experience *astronomically little* welfare, if any at all. But if they are sentient, then they might experience at least *some*.

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<sup>8</sup> For more on the problem of other minds, see Peter Carruthers, "The Problem of Other Minds," in *The Nature of the Mind: an Introduction* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2004), pp. 6-35. And for more on the moral implications, see Jeff Sebo, "The Moral Problem of Other Minds," *The Harvard Review of Philosophy* 25 (2018): pp. 51-70.

My reason for making this empirical assumption is that it seems plausible that an individual with more complex neural systems related to pleasure and pain would be capable of a higher amount of pleasure and pain at a time all else equal. It also seems plausible that an individual with a longer life span would be capable of a higher amount of pleasure and pain over time all else equal. Granted, there are many complications here, and it is unlikely that capacity for welfare at a time will be a simple function of neuron counts, or that capacity for welfare over time will be a simple function of life spans. But this general assumption will be all that I need to motivate the questions that I will ask in this paper.<sup>9</sup>

My third and final empirical assumption is that many other factors will be relevant to our priorities as well, including tractability and indirect effects. First, we need to consider how the limits on our knowledge and power should shape our priorities. For instance, even if our actions impact very many insects, we might not have a duty to help these individuals in practice if we have *no knowledge at all* about how to help them or *no power at all* to help them in particular contexts. I will suggest that we should, in fact, limit how much we prioritize insects and other such beings at present for these reasons. But I will also suggest that we should still prioritize them much more than we do, and much more in the near future than at present.

Second, we need to consider how indirect effects should shape our priorities. In particular, even if our impacts on near future insects matter more than our impacts on near future humans all else equal, our impacts on near future humans might matter more than our impacts on near future insects all things considered, since what happens to humanity will likely determine how many sentient beings can exist and how good their lives can be in the long run. I will once

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<sup>9</sup> For more, see Jason Schukraft, “Differences in the Intensity of Valenced Experience Across Species,” Effective Altruism Forum (2020): <https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/H7KMqMtqNifGYMDft/differences-in-the-intensity-of-valenced-experience-across>

again suggest that we should, in fact, limit how much we prioritize insects and other such beings for these reasons. But I will also, once again, suggest that we should still prioritize them much more than we do, and much more in the near future than at present.

If we put these normative and empirical assumptions together, then we find that utilitarianism might be even more revisionary than we expected. At least in principle, it implies that we can have a duty to prioritize insects over humans, and it also implies that we can have a duty to prioritize microbes over insects. And while the utilitarian might be able to avoid some of these implications in practice given the numbers involved or considerations involving tractability and indirect effects, we will likely not be able to avoid *all* of these implications in these ways. No matter what, a commitment to doing the most good possible will likely require us to prioritize beings who are very unlike us, either in the short term or, at least, in the long run.

### 3. Priority setting

First, we can note that utilitarianism might have surprising implications about priority setting within the current generation. The world contains quintillions of animals, and while some animals have large brains and long lifespans, the vast majority of animals have small bodies and short lifespans. Depending on the details, it might be that small populations of large animals contain the most welfare, or it might be that large populations of small animals do. Either way, utilitarianism holds that we should do the most good possible with limited resources. So if large populations of small animals did contain more welfare overall, then utilitarianism would imply that we should prioritize these populations accordingly, all else equal.

Questions about priority-setting are difficult to answer in many cases in practice, even if we focus on priority-setting within humanity, and even if we assume that we should set priorities in a way that will allow us to do the most good possible. For instance, if we want to do the most good possible, then should we distribute resources to everyone equally, since everyone counts as one and no more than one from an impartial perspective? Should we distribute resources disproportionately to the worst-off among us, since they have the most potential for welfare improvement? Or should we distribute resources disproportionately to the best-off among us, since they can produce benefits that “trickle down” to everyone else?

These questions all arise in multi-species cases as well, with added complexity. First, on the egalitarian view, we would have to ask what equality means in multi-species cases. On one hand, if we count everyone equally, then we can preserve the non-hierarchical nature of egalitarianism, but we also need to accept that, say, individual humans and insects carry the same weight. On the other hand, if we count some individuals more than others (based on, say, how much welfare they can have), then we can deny that individual humans and insects carry the same weight, but we also need to reject the non-hierarchical nature of egalitarianism. And we might still find that insects carry a lot of weight in the aggregate.

Second, on the prioritarian view, we would have to ask whether the considerations that support this view in same-species cases also support it in multi-species cases. On one hand, when different animals have different capacities for welfare, it can be possible for one animal to be much better off than another (because they have more positive welfare at present) while also having much more room for welfare improvement (because they have a much higher capacity for positive welfare). On the other hand, even if insects have much less room for welfare

improvement than humans individually, it can still be possible for them to have much more room for welfare improvement than humans collectively, as long as there are enough of them.<sup>10</sup>

Third, on the trickle-down view, we would similarly have to ask whether the considerations that support this view in the same-species case also support it in multi-species cases. On one hand, there is a risk that as humans improve our lives, we will increase activities that harm insects, like agriculture and deforestation. On the other hand, there is also a possibility that as humans improve our lives, we will increase activities that benefit insects, either intentionally (because we decide to treat insects better) or accidentally (because we decide to treat ourselves better, with benefits for insects too). We need to learn much more about insect welfare and its relationship with other values before we can assess these possibilities.<sup>11</sup>

At least in principle, we can imagine cases where we would, in fact, be morally required to prioritize insect welfare according to any of these views. In these cases we would have at least two options. First, we can accept this conclusion. It might be surprising that we should prioritize simply being stewards of the planet for much larger populations of much smaller beings. But if living in service of insects and other small animals is what impartial benevolence requires, then we should accept that. And if our intuitions call the conclusion into question, then we should dismiss these intuitions as products of self-interest, speciesism, scope insensitivity, the availability heuristic, and other such biases and heuristics.

Alternatively, we can reject features of utilitarianism that lead to this conclusion. For instance, if we reject hedonism, then we might be able to deny that insect and human well-being

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<sup>10</sup> For discussion, see Shelly Kagan, *How to Count Animals, More or Less* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2019).

<sup>11</sup> For more on these issues, see Zach Groff and Yew-Kwang Ng, “Does Suffering Dominate Enjoyment in the Animal Kingdom? An Update to Welfare Biology,” *Biology & Philosophy* 34, no. 4 (2019); Oscar Horta, “Debunking the Idyllic View of Natural Processes: Population Dynamics and Suffering in the Wild”; and Brian Tomasik, “The importance of wild animal suffering.”

are comparable. If we reject totalism, then we might be able to deny that the world with the most net pleasure is the best. And if we reject maximization, then we might be able to deny that we morally ought to produce the best world. These strategies all open up the possibility that we can be morally permitted to prioritize humans over insects independently of the size of our populations. Ultimately, I think that accepting our own marginalization if need be is more plausible than rejecting these features of utilitarianism, but others might disagree.

Of course, even if we accept this conclusion in principle, we might still reject it in many cases in practice, not only for the reasons discussed above but for additional reasons as well. For instance, we might think that we should prioritize humans at present because helping humans is more tractable. But this consideration might not be decisive. After all, if insect welfare is more important but human welfare is more tractable, then we will need to compare these considerations in order to decide what to do. Moreover, even if we should favor humans *at present* for this reason, it might still be that we should favor insects *in the future*, once we have enough knowledge, power, and political will for helping insects to be tractable.

We might also think that we should prioritize humans at present on the grounds that doing so will produce indirect benefits for present and, especially, future sentient beings. In particular, we might think that we should prioritize the far future over the present or near future (since the far future contains much more welfare in expectation), and that doing so requires mitigating existential risks for humanity.<sup>12</sup> But this consideration is not decisive either. After all, helping insects might have indirect benefits for the far future too; for instance, it might help

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<sup>12</sup> For more, see Toby Ord, *The Precipice: Existential Risk and the Future of Humanity* (New York: Hachette Books, 2020); and Hilary Greaves and William MacAskill, “The case for strong longtermism,” GPI Working Paper No. 5 (2021): <https://globalprioritiesinstitute.org/hilary-greaves-william-macaskill-the-case-for-strong-longtermism-2/>.

humanity to mitigate the risk of ecosystem collapse, and it might also help us to expand our moral circle and, so, to treat a wider range of sentient beings well in the future.

Finally, we might think that we should prioritize humans at present on the grounds that humans have more welfare than insects overall in practice, since we might think that there are not enough insects in the world for their high population numbers to compensate for their low average expected welfare. But again, a lot depends on the details. For instance, if we assume that capacity for welfare tracks neuron counts in, say, an exponential manner, then it might be plausible to think that human welfare dominates insect welfare at present. But if we assume that capacity for welfare tracks neuron counts in, say, a linear manner, then it is not plausible to think that human welfare dominates insect welfare at present.<sup>13</sup>

My own view is that the first two points, about tractability and indirect effects, are plausible but not decisive. On one hand, it seems clear that helping humans is more tractable than helping insects at present and that helping humans can indirectly benefit future generations, at least in some respects. On the other hand, it also seems possible that helping insects will become more tractable as we build knowledge, power, and political will toward treating them well. Likewise, it seems possible that helping insects can indirectly benefit future generations as well. Ensuring a positive far future requires increasing the chance that sentient beings will exist *and* have good lives in the far future, and helping insects at present might be useful for both.

In contrast, I think that the third point, about expected welfare, is not plausible. As we will discuss in §5, our knowledge about the neural basis for pleasure and pain is currently extremely limited. As a result, our attempts to estimate what insect lives are like – whether they

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<sup>13</sup> For more, see Mark Budolfson and Dean Spears, “Public Policy, Consequentialism, the Environment, and Non-Human Animals,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Consequentialism*, ed. Douglas W. Portmore (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2020).

can feel pleasure and pain at all, and how much they feel if they can – are highly unlikely to be reliable. And while it might be that the welfare differences between humans and insects are much greater than the neuron count differences, it might also be that the reverse is true. Given our current state of uncertainty, I think that it would be a grave – and convenient – moral mistake to simply proceed on the assumption that human welfare dominates at present.<sup>14</sup>

With all that in mind, my guess is that at the end of the day, the utilitarian will not be required to prioritize insects and other small animals at present for some of the reasons discussed here. But two caveats. First, even if we might not be required to prioritize insects and other small animals at present, we might still be required to consider them much more at present than we are. For instance, we can ban insect farming, ban particular insecticides, and consider insect welfare when creating infrastructure that will include human and nonhuman animals alike. These steps would allow us to benefit humans and insects at the same time, or, at least, would allow us to benefit insects without harming humans much or at all.

Second, even if the utilitarian is morally permitted to prioritize humans and other large animals at present, the utilitarian might or might not be morally permitted to prioritize them in the future. Insofar as the utilitarian takes a neartermist perspective, it might be that we should prioritize insects all else equal in future centuries. And insofar as the utilitarian takes a longtermist perspective, it might be that we should prioritize very different beings all else equal in future millennia. And either way, it might be that we should help insects and other small animals more than we are now as a means to this end, since helping them now is part of what will allow humanity to expand our moral circle and treat nonhumans better in the future.

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<sup>14</sup> For discussion about the difficulty of comparing human and nonhuman minds, see Kristin Andrews, *The Animal Mind: an Introduction to the Philosophy of Animal Cognition* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2015).

#### 4. The repugnant conclusion

Second, and relatedly, we can note that utilitarianism might have surprising implications about priority setting for future generations. Maximizing utility in the future partly requires creating a world in which humans and nonhuman populations can flourish in relative harmony. But it also partly requires considering what kinds of populations to bring into existence in the first place. For instance, should we aim for a world with a higher ratio of large to small animals, the opposite kind of world, or a balance between the two? While asking such questions might seem like playing God, the reality is that humans are already shaping future populations whether we like it or not. So we need to be thoughtful about how we wield this power.

This question is related to a problem in population ethics that Derek Parfit calls *the repugnant conclusion*.<sup>15</sup> Here is the general form of the problem. Suppose that we have to choose between two future populations: population A contains one million people with one million units of pleasure each, and population B contains two million people with 999,999 units of pleasure each. Which future population should we choose? Many people have the intuition that we should choose B, since there are twice as many people and everyone is nearly as happy on average, and so there is nearly twice as much pleasure overall. This intuition is, of course, friendly to utilitarianism, which implies that we should maximize total utility, not average utility.

So far so good. But now suppose that we take this reasoning farther. Instead of choosing two million people with 999,999 units of pleasure each, we choose four million people with 999,998 units of pleasure each. Then we choose eight million people with 999,997 units of pleasure each. Eventually we choose a population where everyone has only one unit of pleasure

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<sup>15</sup> Derek Parfit, *Reasons and Persons*, 381-90.

each, but where the population is so large that they still have nearly twice as much pleasure as the previous one in the aggregate. Many people have the intuition that we should not choose such a population. Parfit shares this intuition, and so he calls the idea that we should accept this population *the repugnant conclusion*. This intuition is, of course, less friendly to utilitarianism.

While many people default to thinking about the repugnant conclusion in same-species cases, we can think about it in multispecies cases as well. In a same-species case, we might compare small human populations with high average welfare with large human populations with low (but still positive) average welfare. In a multi-species case, we might compare small human populations with high average welfare with large, say, ant populations with low (but still positive) average welfare. Either way, the outcome is the same in both cases: One population contains much more pleasure on average, the other population contains much more pleasure in total, and we need to determine which state of affairs is better all else equal.

Granted, there are many relevant differences between same-species and multi-species cases, particularly in the real world. For instance, we might wonder whether we have to choose between ants and humans and whether ants really do experience more net pleasure than humans. But while these details might allow us to avoid this problem in some cases in practice, they do not allow us to avoid the problem in principle, or even, necessarily, in all cases in practice. *If* we have to choose between ants and humans, and *if* the ants would experience more net pleasure than humans, *then* we should bring about the ant population, according to this reasoning. This is the idea that we can call *the repugnant conclusion*.<sup>16</sup>

As always, when a (seemingly) plausible argument leads to a (seemingly) implausible conclusion, we have at least two options. First, we can accept the conclusion. For instance, in

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<sup>16</sup> For similar discussion, see [reference omitted].

this case we can accept that we might sometimes be required to produce large populations of small animals rather than small populations of large animals, provided that doing so will, in fact, maximize utility. Granted, we might experience this implication as implausible. But all moral theories have *some* seemingly implausible implications. And given our self-interest, speciesism, status quo bias, scope insensitivity, and so on, we should expect to experience these implications as implausible even if they are in fact correct.

Our second option is to reject features of utilitarianism that lead to this conclusion. For example, as we discussed in the last section, if we reject hedonism, then we might be able to deny that insect and human well-being are comparable.<sup>17</sup> If we reject totalism, then we might be able to deny that the world with the most net pleasure is best.<sup>18</sup> And if we reject maximization, then we might be able to deny that we are morally required to produce the best possible world.<sup>19</sup> Philosophers commonly make such moves to reject the repugnant conclusion, and they can do the same here. As before, my own view is that accepting the repugnant conclusion is better than rejecting some or all of these views, but others might disagree.<sup>20</sup>

With that said, as before, even if we accept this conclusion in principle, we might be able to reject it, or at least constrain it, in many cases in practice. First, we might once again worry about tractability. It seems relatively tractable to be able to create more humans and other large animals *and* ensure that these animals have net positive experiences in the future. In contrast,

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<sup>17</sup> For a defense of this view, see Christine M. Korsgaard, *Fellow Creatures: Our Obligations to the Other Animals* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2018), Chapter 4.

<sup>18</sup> For analysis of key assumptions underlying totalism, see Iwao Hirose, *Moral Aggregation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).

<sup>19</sup> For discussion of non-maximizing views, see Dale Jamieson and Robert Elliot, “Progressive consequentialism,” *Philosophical Perspectives* 23, 2009, 241–251, Michael Slote, “Satisficing Consequentialism,” *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 58, 1984: 139–63, and Neil Sinhababu, “Scalar Consequentialism the Right Way,” *Philosophical Studies*, 175, 2018: 3131–3144.

<sup>20</sup> For discussion of why the repugnant conclusion is not necessarily bad, see Stéphanie Zuber et al, “What should we agree on about the repugnant conclusion?” *Utilitas* (2021), 1–5, doi: <https://doi.org/10.1017/S095382082100011X>

while it seems relatively tractable to be able to create more insects and other small animals in the future, it might or might not be tractable to ensure that they have net positive experiences, particularly if they continue to reproduce through r-selection.<sup>21</sup> For this reason we might think that we should aim for smaller populations of larger animals in many cases for the time being.

Second, we might once again worry about indirect effects not only in the near future but also in the far future. That is, even if we feel confident that increasing the ratio of small to large animals would maximize utility in the short term, we might not be confident that it will do so in the long run. The reason is the same as before: If we want to maximize utility in the far future, then we might need to ensure that humanity can survive long enough to ensure that many beings will exist in the far future and have net positive welfare. This consideration might save us from a revisionary neartermist implication, but only by replacing it with a revisionary longtermist implication, as we will discuss in the next two sections.

Finally, we might once again worry about empirical facts regarding insects and other small animals. We already noted some of these assumptions above: It would need to be the case that we face a choice between bringing about a small population of large animals and bringing about a large population of small animals; that the population of small animals would have less welfare on average and more welfare in total than the population of large animals; and that the population of small animals would have net positive welfare rather than net negative welfare. If we reject any of these assumptions, then we might be able to avoid the repugnant conclusion, at least in its pure form, in the real world in the near future.

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<sup>21</sup> For more, see Zach Groff and Yew-Kwang Ng, “Does Suffering Dominate Enjoyment in the Animal Kingdom? An Update to Welfare Biology”; Oscar Horta, “Debunking the Idyllic View of Natural Processes: Population Dynamics and Suffering in the Wild”; and Brian Tomasik, “The importance of wild animal suffering.”

Once again, my own view is that the first two points, about tractability and indirect effects, are plausible but not decisive. To add to the points made in the previous section, it seems clear that we can more effectively improve the lives of small populations of large animals than improve the lives of large populations of small animals at present. But this situation can change. The more we improve our knowledge about small animals and our power to help them, the more we might be able to improve their lives effectively at scale as well. And if and when that happens, the utilitarian will have to take more seriously the possibility that we should prioritize expanding and assisting these populations on grounds of scale and tractability.

Unlike in the previous section, I also think that the third point is plausible in this context. At least for now, all realistic options will involve bringing about mixed populations of large and small animals with good and bad lives. But as we will see in §6, we might at least face a choice between increasing or decreasing the ratio of large to small animals in the world. And whether or not small animals have net positive expected welfare, we should still need to consider them when deciding what to do. Specifically, if they have net positive expected welfare, then we should treat any policy that creates more or fewer of them as good or bad, to that degree. And if they have net negative expected welfare, then we should do the reverse.

With all that said, my guess is that at the end of the day, the utilitarian will not be required to prioritize bringing about insects and other small animals in the near future for reasons involving tractability, indirect effects, and uncertainty about their welfare. But the same two caveats apply as before. First, even if we might not be required to prioritize bringing about insects and other small animals in the near future, we might still be required to consider them much more than we are. For instance, to the degree that we expect practices such as agriculture,

deforestation, and development to create more or fewer small animals with good or bad lives, then we should at the very least assign weight to this consideration when deciding what to do.

Second, and additionally, even if the utilitarian is morally permitted to prioritize humans and other large animals in the near future, we might not be morally permitted to prioritize these animals in the far future. As I have mentioned and will discuss more in the next section, insofar as the utilitarian takes a longtermist perspective, it might be that we should prioritize very different kinds of beings in the far future. And either way, it might be that we should help insects and other small animals much more than we are at present as a means to this end, since helping insects and other small animals now is part of what will allow humanity to expand our moral circle and treat a wider range of nonhuman beings better in the future.

## 5. Pascal's bugging

But the real test for utilitarianism is not beings who have, say, a 10-90% chance of being sentient, as insects and many other small animals do, but rather beings who have, say, a .000001% chance of being sentient. Specifically, the real test is the prospect of an *astronomically high* number of beings who have an *astronomically low* but non-zero chance of being sentient. In this kind of case, as long as this population is large enough, expected utility theory will imply that we should favor it all else equal, even if its members all have a *very low* chance of being sentient and a *very low* level of welfare if any at all. And as with the previous two issues, this issue might arise for the utilitarian not only in theory but also in practice.

This problem is an instance of what Eliezer Yudkowsky calls *Pascal's mugging*.<sup>22</sup>

Suppose that a mugger walks up to you, and instead of threatening you with a weapon, they propose a deal. If you give them \$10 today, then they promise to return tomorrow and give you \$20 in exchange. In this case it might be rational for you to decline this offer, all else equal, since it might be rational for you to have a very low credence that the mugger will keep their promise, and, so, to expect that you would receive less than \$10 back. For instance, if it would be rational for you to have only a .01 credence that the mugger will keep their promise, then it would be rational for you to expect only ten cents back from your investment.

So far so good. But now suppose that the mugger keeps negotiating. They promise to return with increasingly high amounts of money, and they explain to you how they would convert your money into these higher amounts. With each new promise, you might think that they are less likely to keep this promise but that it would be better if they did. In this case, as long as the probability of benefit remains non-zero and the level of benefit increases enough, at some point you might become rationally required to take the deal. This implication presents a challenge to expected utility theory. Can we really be rationally required to bet on an astronomically low chance of an astronomically high benefit in this kind of case?

As some philosophers have noted, similar problems can arise for utilitarianism. Suppose that there is an astronomically low chance that we can bring about an astronomically high number of distant future happy people. In this case, if the size of this population is large enough, then we might be morally required to prioritize producing this population according to utilitarianism, all else equal. That is, utilitarianism might require us to pursue a course of action

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<sup>22</sup> Eliezer Yudkowsky, "Pascal's mugging: tiny probabilities of vast utilities," *Less Wrong* (2007): <https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/a5JAiTdyt0u3Jg749/pascal-s-mugging-tiny-probabilities-of-vast-utilities>. See also Nick Bostrom, "Pascal's wager," *Analysis* 69:3 (2009), 443-445.

that has an astronomically low chance of creating and benefiting an astronomically high number of far future people, rather than courses of action that have higher chances of creating and/or benefiting lower (but still very high) numbers of current or near future people.<sup>23</sup>

Now consider a similar case. Suppose that there is an astronomically low chance that members of a particular population are sentient, and that each member of this population can experience an astronomically low amount of welfare if they are. As before, if the size of this population is large enough, then we might be morally required to prioritize this population according to utilitarianism, all else equal. The moral math in this case is the same as the moral math in the previous case. The only difference is that, in the above case, the people are definitely sentient but very unlikely to exist, whereas in this case, the people definitely exist but are very unlikely to be sentient (and they have a very low capacity for welfare if they are).

We can also imagine cases that involve both features at once. For instance, suppose that there is an astronomically low chance that we can bring about an astronomically high number of, say, distant future microbes. Suppose further that each microbe has an astronomically low chance of being sentient and has an astronomically low amount of welfare if any at all. Finally, suppose that we can nevertheless still maximize expected utility by pursuing this option, given the sheer size of this population. In this case, a utilitarian might be required to forego creating and benefiting beings who are *very likely* sentient and/or who will *very likely* exist, all for the sake of beings who are merely *possibly* sentient and who will merely *possibly* exist.

This implication, which we can call *Pascal's bugging*, raises the stakes of the intragenerational and intergenerational priority-setting issues discussed in the previous two sections. First, it raises the stakes for the intragenerational issue because now our priority-setting

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<sup>23</sup> See Hilary Greaves and William MacAskill, "The case for strong longtermism."

decisions will depend not only on the implications for, say, insects, but also on the implications for even larger populations of even smaller beings. For example, if we discover that the world contains so many microbes that the “micro-population” contains more expected welfare than the “macro-population,” then we would have to accept that the rightness or wrongness of our actions depends primarily on the expected impacts on the former population.

Second, Pascal’s bugging raises the stakes for the intergenerational issue because now we might need to prioritize not only large populations whose members have a low amount of welfare on average, but also *very* large populations whose members have a *very* low chance of being sentient, and who have a *very* low amount of welfare on average if any at all. For example, if our choice is between creating a given number of future mammals,  $1e+18$  times as many future insects, and  $1e+36$  times as many future microbes, then, depending on the probabilities and utilities we assign in each case, we might not only be morally required to select the insects instead of the mammals but also to select the microbes instead of the insects.

As always, when faced with this kind of conclusion, we have several options. First, we can accept the conclusion. If current or future micro-populations did, in fact, contain more expected welfare than current or future macro-populations, then we would, in fact, be required to prioritize these micro-populations all else equal. Granted, this implication might seem highly implausible. But no moral theory has exclusively plausible implications, and of course, the point of morality is to improve on our moral thinking rather than to merely confirm everything that we already think. And in this case, we can expect that human bias and ignorance would prime us to find Pascal’s bugging highly implausible even if it was correct.

Alternatively, we can reject features of utilitarianism that lead to this conclusion. For instance, if we want to reject the conclusion in principle, then then we might need to reject a

feature of standard expected utility theory such as its *fanaticism*. In particular, we might need to hold that we should apply standard expected utility theory in cases involving ordinary risks, including cases involving low risks of high impacts, such as a 1/1000 chance of a very good or bad outcome. But we might also think that we should take a different approach in cases involving astronomically low risks of astronomically high impacts, for instance by discounting or bracketing these possibilities in order to avoid the kinds of implications discussed here.<sup>24</sup>

Of course, as in the previous sections, even if we accept the conclusion in principle, we might still be able to deny it, or at least constrain it, in many cases in practice. For example, if we think that we have no knowledge or power regarding microbe welfare, then we might think that we can bracket our impacts on microbes in practice *whether or not* they contain more expected value than macro-populations. But a lot depends on whether we have *zero* knowledge and power or, rather, *very little* knowledge and power. If we have *zero* knowledge and power, then this reply might work. But if we instead have *very little* knowledge and power, then while this reply might add an extra line to our moral math, it might or might not affect the outcome.

Similarly, if we think that the probability that microbes are sentient is *zero*, then we might be able to avoid this problem with respect to micro-populations. Or if we think that the probabilities and utilities are so low that the expected value of micro-populations is still relatively low, in spite of the size of these populations, then we might be able to avoid this problem with respect to these populations too. Given the problem of other minds, I think that the “low expected value” response is more plausible than the “no expected value” response. It would be rash to think that there is *no chance* that microbes can consciously experience *any positive or negative states at all*, no matter how minimal. But both responses can be explored.

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<sup>24</sup> For discussion, see Hayden Wilkinson, “In defence of fanaticism,” *Ethics* (forthcoming).

While there is too much uncertainty for us to say much with confidence at this stage, we have at least some reason to think that micro-populations could carry a lot of weight in expectation. For instance, according to one recent estimate, “there are between  $10^{23}$  and  $10^{24}$  neurons on earth,” most of which are “distributed roughly evenly among small land arthropods, fish, and nematodes, or possibly dominated by nematodes.”<sup>25</sup> Nematodes are microscopic organisms with simple nervous systems and about 300 neurons each. In my view, they are good candidates for the kind of being that we are considering: very low but non-zero chance of being sentient, very low capacity for welfare if any at all, but numerous enough that it could add up.

As before, the utilitarian might or might not think that we should *prioritize* nematodes in practice any time soon, if any time at all. But even if not, we might still think that we should *consider* nematodes (along with other, similar beings) much more than we are. In this case we can make all the same points as before: A lot depends on the tractability of promoting nematode welfare, on the indirect effects of promoting nematode welfare, and on the exact probabilities and utilities that we assign to nematode welfare. But if and when we do determine that nematodes have net positive or negative expected welfare, then we might once again have to treat any policy that creates more or fewer of these individuals as good or bad to that degree.

## 6. Implications

Throughout this discussion I have emphasized that utilitarianism might have these implications not only in principle but also, at least to a degree, in some cases in practice. I now want to consider two possible scenarios where that might be true. In the relative near term (that is, in the

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<sup>25</sup> For informal discussion, see Georgia Ray, “How many neurons are there?” *Eukaryote Writes Blog*: <https://eukaryotewritesblog.com/how-many-neurons-are-there/>

next thousand years), utilitarianism could imply that which actions are right or wrong depends primarily on the expected impacts for large populations of small animals. And beyond that, utilitarianism could imply that which actions are right or wrong depends primarily on the expected impacts for large populations of digital beings. Both of these implications might at least partly match the scenarios that we have been considering.

Consider first the nearertermist implication. Many humans think that global changes such as climate change are bad because of the expected impacts for humans. Of course, this view makes sense. Climate change will cause melting ice caps, rising sea levels, flooding coastal areas, conflict over land, water, and energy, and an increase in extreme weather events such as hurricanes and tsunamis. It will also be a threat multiplier that amplifies existing threats for humans such as hunger, thirst, illness, and injury. As a result, many humans will suffer and die, including and especially the most vulnerable among us. While many humans will also prosper, we can reasonably expect that the net effects for humans will be negative.<sup>26</sup>

But when we consider nonhumans too, we realize that the impacts of climate change will be much more complex. While many animals will suffer, many other animals will flourish. And while many nonhuman populations will contract, many others will expand. While much remains unclear, one possibility (which, to be clear, is only a possibility) is that climate change will produce a world with a higher ratio of small to large animals. Warmer climates tend to favor smaller animals, both by allowing them to migrate north and south and by causing some larger animals to shrink. As a result, we could find that a world reshaped by climate change contains more animals and welfare in total but smaller animals and less welfare on average.<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> For more on the nature and ethics of climate change, see Dale Jamieson, *Reason in a Dark Time: Why the Struggle against Climate Change Failed - and What It Means for Our Future* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014).

<sup>27</sup> For more on the impacts on the distribution of animals, see Daniel Bebber, Mark Ramotowski, and Sarah Gurr, "Crop pests and pathogens move polewards in a warming world," *Nature Climate Change* 3:11 (2013), 985-988. For

If this scenario were to arise (which, again, is a big ‘if’), then a lot will depend on whether we expect wild animals to have net positive or negative experiences. In the former case, we might think that climate change will produce a real-life rebugnant conclusion, by producing large populations of small animals, such that animals experience less pleasure on average but more pleasure in total. Otherwise we might think that climate change will do the reverse, by producing large populations of small animals, such that animals experience less pain on average but more pain in total. So in this scenario, climate change would be either very good or very bad according to utilitarianism, depending on how we evaluate the lives of wild animals.

Now consider the longtermist implication. If humanity survives climate change and the other global catastrophic threats that will imperil our species over the next thousand years, then we might face an open future with opportunities for expansion. That is, we might have the ability to spread beyond the planet, and we might also have the motivation to do so. After all, as long as we can survive as a species, humanity will have at least a billion years before solar radiation makes this planet uninhabitable. So whether we initiate an expansion in a thousand years or in a billion years, we will plausibly launch one at some point if we can. We will then have billions of years to extend sentient life throughout the universe, for better or for worse.<sup>28</sup>

The question is how we would go about extending sentient life throughout the universe, if we could. Consider two options. The first is a biological approach: We aim to create as many happy biological minds as possible, by building space stations and, perhaps, terraformed planets on which (post-)humans and, perhaps, (post-)nonhumans can live. The second is a digital approach: We aim to create as many happy digital minds as possible, by building large, solar-

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more on the impacts on the size of animals, see Brian Weeks et al, “Shared morphological consequences of global warming in North American migratory birds,” *Ecology Letters* 23 (2020): 316-325.

<sup>28</sup> Nick Bostrom, “Astronomical Waste: The Opportunity Cost of Delayed Technological Development,” *Utilitas* 15:3 (2003), 308-314.

powered networks of digital minds who can experience pleasure. While it is plausible that we can achieve a very large future population either way, it is also plausible that we can achieve a much larger future population with the digital approach than with the biological approach.<sup>29</sup>

I imagine that our successors would pursue a mixed approach at first (if for no other reason than to further reduce existential risk and oversee whatever further expansions might be optimal). But I can also imagine scenarios where, motivated by utilitarian considerations, they pursue the digital-centric approach beyond that. This approach might or might not be repugnant in at least some respects. Depending on the details, it might or might not be that future digital minds have a lower chance of being sentient than future biological minds, and that they have a lower capacity for welfare if they are sentient. But even if so, it might also be that the potentially astronomically large size of a digital population is more than enough to make up for that.

Somewhat ironically, it might be that if we avoid this kind of far future repugnant conclusion, then the reason will be that we face a far future “utility monster” conclusion. That is, when we ask what kind of future being to create in order to maximize utility, the answer will likely not be (a) a population of beings like us, but will likely instead either be (b) a much larger population of much smaller beings or (c) a much smaller population of much larger beings. And whereas option (b) might remind us of the repugnant conclusion, option (c) might remind us of the utility monster problem. Either way, if the answer is anything other than option (a), we might feel uncomfortable with that, and we will then have to decide what to do about that.

Also somewhat ironically, it might be that if we avoid the nearertermist problem, then the reason will be that we face one of these longtermist ones. That is, even if we were to determine that climate change is good in the short term (because it creates larger populations of smaller

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<sup>29</sup> For more discussion, see Tyler John, “Panspecies longtermism,” unpublished manuscript.

animals with higher total welfare), we might still determine that climate change is bad in the long run (because it increases existential risks for humanity, thereby reducing the probability that we can survive long enough to spread positive welfare beyond this planet). In this scenario, utilitarianism would vindicate the commonsense view that climate change is bad, but it might do so only instrumentally, in service of strange and surprising far future goals.

So are these possible implications ultimately acceptable? I think that they could be. It helps that they might not arise, and that they might not be pure “repugnant” cases if they do. I am skeptical that the utilitarian will face a future where the optimal course of action, in expectation, involves filling the universe with beings who have a very low chance of being sentient and who would experience a very low amount of pleasure if so, such as nematodes. Instead, it might be that we face a future where the optimal course of action, in expectation, involves filling the universe with beings who have a reasonably high chance of being sentient and who would experience a reasonably high (if not very high) amount of pleasure if so.

Granted, even this partly “repugnant” conclusion will strike many as implausible. We might not like the idea of betting the future on beings who merely *might* be sentient, for all we know (depending on how much progress we will have made on the problem of other minds at that point). And we might not like the idea that climate change could be good for all we know (depending on how it expands and contracts nonhuman populations and on whether nonhumans have good or bad lives), if not for its effects on the far future. But these strike me as the kinds of bullets that a utilitarian might be able and willing to bite, especially as time passes, utilitarian values spread, and the prospects for digital sentience improve.

Of course, even this discussion of possible implications is highly abstract. As I have emphasized throughout the paper, many other factors will be relevant too; for instance, it will

matter a lot how likely particular beings are to be sentient; how much pleasure and pain particular beings are likely to experience, if any at all; whether climate change will, in fact, produce larger populations of smaller animals; whether taking a digital-centric approach will, in fact, be the optimal path; whether digital minds will, in fact, have the features that I described; and whether humanity can, in fact, overcome epistemic, practical, and motivational obstacles that currently stand in the way of prioritizing very different kinds of being.

This leads to a further, more intuitively plausible, implication for the utilitarian. We need to make progress on these issues now, so that we can build knowledge, power, and political will toward creating a better world for large populations of small beings. We might or might not face any pure “repugnant” conclusions in practice. But if we do, we will need to be epistemically, practically, and motivationally ready. And even if not, we will still face the weaker – but still radical – conclusion that insects and other small beings carry much more weight than we might have thought. We will need to consider our impacts on these beings very carefully in the future, whether or not we should prioritize them all things considered.

In closing, it is worth reiterating that many of these problems can arise for non-utilitarian moral theories as well. Whether we think about morality primarily in terms of welfare, rights, virtues, relationships, or other such features of life, we will have to ask how to set priorities between large populations of small beings and small populations of large beings, both at present and in the future. And while we might be able to avoid some of the implications discussed here by rejecting features of utilitarianism such as hedonism, totalism, or fanaticism, we might not be able to avoid all of them that way. Ultimately, the more we accept how large and varied the moral community is, the stranger morality will become.